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Notes
The Fate of BitTorrent John Does:
A Civil Procedure Analysis of
Copyright Litigation
Patience Ren*
Copyright owners can trace online violations to an infringer’s Internet protocol address
but cannot identify her unless they obtain court approval to serve a subpoena on an
Internet service provider. As the most popular peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol today,
BitTorrent requires users to share files with each other in a conspiracy-like fashion. By
arguing that this feature imparts a “same transaction” character to BitTorrent
infringement activities, a copyright owner can seek to join multitudes of Internet protocol
addresses as John Doe defendants in an application for early discovery. Courts are
divided as to whether early discovery should be granted where tens, hundreds, or
sometimes thousands of Internet protocol addresses are joined together in one case. Many
in the Internet user community fault copyright owners for using the courts as a mere
instrument to seek identification information en masse as part of a coercive practice to
induce monetary settlements. This Note examines how case law relating to early discovery
and civil procedure joinder rules applies to multiple defendants allegedly participating in
a “same transaction” that occurs solely within the inner workings of a file-sharing
protocol. Even if BitTorrent usage legally supports joinder, this Note highlights the
difficult balance between the right to enforce a copyright and the rights of Internet users to
be free from litigation threats. Without a legislative response that is resilient in the face of
an ever-changing technology, copyright infringement problems will continue to inundate
our courts.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013. Thanks to Professor Ben
Depoorter for his invaluable guidance and Professors Richard Marcus and Christian Mammen for
helpful discussions. I would also like to thank Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte and her
clerks for inspiration. I am especially grateful to the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their
exceptional work.
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Introduction
On May 24, 2010, Voltage Pictures, L.L.C. filed a complaint against
five thousand unnamed individuals who allegedly used a peer-to-peer file
transfer (“P2P”) protocol called BitTorrent to illegally download Voltage
Pictures’ copyrighted and award-winning motion picture The Hurt
1
Locker. The defendants were unidentified John Does because their
infringing activities could only be traced to their Internet protocol (“IP”)
2
addresses. The court granted early discovery against all the defendants
and allowed for the subpoena of identification information corresponding
to each IP address from Time Warner and other Internet service providers
3
(“ISPs”). Upon receiving the subpoenas, the ISPs provided notice to the
4
defendants, informing them of their right to quash the subpoenas.
Without a successful challenge, the ISPs would be required to turn over
subscriber information such as names, phone numbers, and addresses.
Voltage Pictures subsequently received identification information on a
rolling basis and requested several extensions of time to serve the
defendants, which the court also granted. Public outcry ensued, branding
5
this practice a “copyright troll.” One blog calculated that if putative
defendants agreed to monetary settlements of $2000 each, Voltage
1. Voltage Pictures, L.L.C. v. Doe, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (2011).
2. An Internet protocol address is a unique number that identifies a computer or device
connected to a network.
3. Voltage Pictures, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
4. Id. at 32 n.3.
5. Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. 12-10761-WGY, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142079, at *1 n.1 (D.
Mass. Oct. 2, 2012).
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Pictures and its attorneys would likely net millions, a number that is
6
comparable to or more than The Hurt Locker’s U.S. box office sales.
In April 2011, Voltage Pictures voluntarily dismissed 557 putative
7
defendants, implying that Voltage Pictures received satisfactory
settlements from the dismissed defendants. A large number of the
remaining defendants filed motions to quash based on several grounds,
8
one of which was improper joinder. According to the defendants’
argument, there was no evidence to suggest that all of their alleged
conduct constituted the same transaction or occurrence under Rule 20 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so there was no justification for
joining multiple defendants in one lawsuit. The court rejected that
argument and found joinder to be proper because the unique features of
BitTorrent require online download and upload activities to occur in a
collective fashion, satisfying the standard of “same transaction [or]
9
occurrence” as required by Rule 20.
Voltage Pictures is representative of hundreds of massive John Doe
litigation cases that populate the dockets of district courts around the
10
country. An issue common to these cases is whether defendants’ conduct,
including the use of the BitTorrent protocol, constitutes the same
transaction or occurrence to justify joinder during early discovery. The
analysis requires a detailed examination of how the protocol operates to
11
exchange files online. Courts are divided on this joinder issue, and the
decision of Voltage Pictures to grant joinder is far from being the
consensus. On one hand, many courts closely follow the reasoning of
Voltage Pictures. They conclude that the facts pleaded in the complaint
satisfy joinder requirements because of the unique technological features
of BitTorrent, which mandate simultaneous uploading and downloading
12
in groups called “swarms.” On the other hand, other district courts have
rejected this “swarm” theory as inadequate to meet the standard of the
13
“same transaction [or] occurrence” required by Rule 20.

6. Julianne Pepitone, 50,000 BitTorrent Users Sued for Alleged Illegal Downloads, CNNMoney
(June 10, 2011, 3:59PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/10/technology/bittorrent_lawsuits/index.htm.
7. Voltage Pictures, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
8. Id. at 38.
9. Id. at 40.
10. See, e.g., infra notes 150, 156–195; see also Media Prods. v. Does, No. 12 Civ. 3719 (HB), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125366, at *5 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2012) (listing BitTorrent cases and commenting
that “[i]t is difficult to even imagine the extraordinary amount of time federal judges have spent on
these cases”).
11. See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech.
L. 695, 721 (2011).
12. See infra notes 156–166.
13. See infra notes 186, 189–191.
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The issue of joinder in online copyright infringement cases is not
completely new to the courts; it also arose during the first flood of John
Doe litigation launched by the Recording Industry Association of
14
American (“RIAA”) in early 2003. The RIAA lawsuits followed on the
heels of court decisions that held liable P2P service providers that
15
induced online copyright infringement. Although such decisions snuffed
16
out P2P technologies like Napster and Grokster, P2P usage was
17
anything but dampened, and the John Doe litigation did not disappear
18
after RIAA lawsuits waned. A new wave of John Doe litigation has
19
recently emerged, targeting users of BitTorrent. BitTorrent replaced
20
the older technologies and is currently the most popular P2P protocol,
boasting more than 150 million users and accounting for almost half of
21
upload traffic during peak times.
Because the BitTorrent litigation shares similarities with the RIAA
litigation, the older decisions form a legal backdrop against which the
courts now adjudge BitTorrent cases. Akin to the RIAA litigation,
BitTorrent cases are filed against end users who actually participated in
the transfer of copyrighted files, as opposed to P2P service providers who
22
developed or supported the tools for file transfer. Defendants in both
the RIAA and BitTorrent litigation were initially named John Does and
23
identified only by their corresponding IP addresses. In both generations
of lawsuits, the plaintiffs seek to aggregate claims against a large number

14. David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual
Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1685, 1702–08 (2005);
David Kravets, File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After Five Years of RIAA Litigation, Wired
(Sept. 4, 2008, 2:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/proving-file-sh.
15. E.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
16. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) (holding that, by
harboring an intention to promote to Grokster users a method of copyright infringement, defendant is
liable for the resulting infringement by the third-party users); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643,
653 (7th Cir. 2003) (shutting down Aimster); Arista Records L.L.C. v. Lime Group L.L.C., 715 F. Supp.
2d 481, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that LimeWire, a Gnutella client, induced copyright infringement).
17. Bridy, supra note 11, at 703; Ankur R. Patel, BitTorrent Beware: Legitimizing BitTorrent
Against Secondary Copyright Liability, 10 Appalachian J.L. 117, 119 (2011).
18. See, e.g., Adam Langston, Note, Return of the John Doe: Protecting Anonymous Defendants in
Copyright Infringement Actions, 41 Stetson L. Rev. 875, 879–85 (2012) (reviewing the history of
copyright litigation since the RIAA litigation).
19. See, e.g., id.
20. Bridy, supra note 11, at 703; Patel, supra note 17, at 119.
21. BitTorrent and µTorrent Software Surpass 150 Million User Milestone; Announce New
Consumer Electronics Partnerships, BitTorrent Inc. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.bittorrent.com/intl/es/
company/about/ces_2012_150m_users; BitTorrent and Netflix Dominate America’s Internet Traffic,
TorrentFreak (Oct. 27, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-and-netflix-dominate-americasInternet-traffic-111027.
22. For example, litigation against P2P users launched by RIAA. See infra note 129.
23. Eliot Van Buskirk, RIAA to Stop Suing Music Fans, Cut Them off Instead, WIRED (Dec. 19,
2008, 7:26 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/12/riaa-says-it-pl.
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of defendants into single cases. RIAA lawsuits eventually tapered off
after 2008, when RIAA obtained preliminary agreements from the ISPs
24
to cooperate in RIAA’s fight against online piracy. However, critics
claimed that the real reason for abandoning the lawsuits was that the
litigation strategy did nothing to decrease copyright infringement and
25
only increased negative publicity for RIAA.
Differences in technology cause the BitTorrent litigation to differ in
significant aspects from the RIAA litigation. First, RIAA’s attempts to
join several IP addresses were mostly based on the fact that the addresses
were derived from a single ISP, such as a network on a college campus,
and not much more. Although the question of joinder sometimes arose in
the RIAA litigation, courts could easily find improper joinder for reasons
unrelated to the type of P2P protocol employed. This was because in the
RIAA cases, each of the multiple defendants allegedly downloaded
different songs, owned by different plaintiffs, and there was no evidentiary
support that they constituted the “same transaction, occurrence, or series
26
of transactions or occurrences.” Unlike the RIAA cases, each BitTorrent
case is concerned with only one copyrighted work.
Second, courts in the RIAA litigation neither reached a consensus
27
nor had to delve deep into the legal issues because, unlike BitTorrent, the
older P2P technologies did not have any features in support of joinder,
such as simultaneous uploading and downloading in a “swarm.” Most
importantly, the exact type of P2P technology was not a concern to either
28
the courts or the parties. These differences are the centerpiece of the
BitTorrent plaintiffs’ arguments in distinguishing their cases from those
of RIAA. Thus, the BitTorrent plaintiffs’ argument for joining multiple
defendants mainly rests on the intrinsic nature of the BitTorrent filesharing scheme. Another reason why the issue of joinder was not of great
concern to RIAA was because RIAA launched this crusade as much to
send a message to stem online piracy as to recoup losses from copyright
infringement. As such, joining multiple defendants might not have been
24. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, Wall St. J., Dec. 19,
2008, at B1, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html.
25. Id.
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
27. See infra notes 28, 129.
28. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 07-1515, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27170, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. Apr. 3, 2008) (not disclosing the protocol used by plaintiffs but noting that they merely used the
Internet); BMG Music v. Does 1–4, No. 3:06-cv-01579-MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53237, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. July 31, 2006) (identifying that the plaintiffs used the same ISP, Covad Communications, but not
disclosing the P2P protocol); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 04 Civ. 2289 (RWS), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23560, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004) (finding that the defendants used the FastTrack
network); Interscope Records v. Does 1–25, No. 6:04-cv-197-Orl-22DAB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27782, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (noting that plaintiffs were using FastTrack, the protocol of
several older P2P clients such as Grokster and KaZaa).
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RIAA’s top priority because obtaining a large sum of damages from one
defendant could very well accomplish RIAA’s objective of publicizing
the penalty associated with piracy.
Small movie and adult film companies, which constitute the majority
29
of plaintiffs in this recent influx of Doe litigation, all share the same
incentive of joining large number of defendants. These lawsuits essentially
underlie a business model where it is only financially worthwhile if the
names and addresses of multitudes of defendants can be subpoenaed in
one filing. The usage of BitTorrent by defendants can make for a strong
joinder claim since the means by which files are transferred over the
BitTorrent network in groups called “swarms” may meet Rule 20’s
“same transaction and occurrence” requirement.
The BitTorrent plaintiffs first link IP addresses to instances of
infringing activities by monitoring the BitTorrent network. Then the
plaintiffs need to overcome a major procedural hurdle to pursue their
claims following the filing of a complaint. Before the BitTorrent plaintiffs
can serve complaints on the Doe defendants—identified only by their IP
addresses—the plaintiffs need to obtain identification information, such
as the names and addresses connected to the IP addresses from ISPs like
AT&T and Comcast. However, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil
30
Procedure requires court approval for such a subpoena. When a court
issues this discovery order, the court often imposes conditions pursuant
31
to its discretion to protect persons affected by the subpoena. Such
conditions often include a notice to accompany the order instructing the
ISPs to distribute information to the Internet service subscriber to inform
her of her rights and options, such as filing a motion to quash the
32
subpoena.
Although the subpoena is sought in the name of serving the
defendants so as to proceed with litigation, it is commonly assumed that
the plaintiffs are only interested in obtaining identification information
for a large number of IP addresses in one fell swoop in order to secure

29. See Jason Koebler, Porn Companies File Mass Piracy Lawsuits: Are You at Risk?, U.S. News
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/02/02/porn-companies-file-mass-piracy-lawsuitsare-you-at-risk. Later, publishing and video game companies joined this litigation frenzy. See, e.g.,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Does 1–30, 12 Civ. 3782 (LTS)(JLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135468
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2012); Aerosoft GMBH v. Does 1–50, No. 12-21489-CIV-SEITZ/SIMONTON,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68709, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2012).
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3) (“The clerk must issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a
party who requests it.”).
31. Id. 45(c)(3)(B).
32. CP Prod. v. Doe, No. CIV 2:12-cv-0616 WBS JFM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107045, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. July 30, 2012) (“The subpoenas required the ISPs to notify subscribers of the IP addresses whose
information was to be released so that the subscribers would have an opportunity to file objections or
motions to quash with the court.”).
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33

monetary settlements from putative defendants. After a defendant pays
the proposed settlement amount, the plaintiff then voluntarily dismisses
the case against the defendant. The assumption that plaintiffs have no
intention to pursue the claims to judgment or even to serve the defendants
is reasonable because the strategy for profitability rests in the economies
34
of scale of quick settlements from a large number of defendants.
Accordingly, joining a large number of defendants in one filing is key to
the plaintiffs’ business model.
Although the plaintiffs may legally justify joinder of a large number
of defendants in a single case based on the swarm features of BitTorrent,
they encounter a different type of hurdle in the public sphere that raises
normative concerns. A defendant who receives an offer letter to settle
for $3000, for example, often feels compelled to pay in order to avoid the
hassle of litigation. For example, one of the many oft-circulated news
stories publicizing the alleged predatory activities of plaintiffs involves a
grandmother who was ignorant of the importance of securing her wireless
connection. Unidentified neighbors might have used her wireless
connection to infringe on copyrighted works. A BitTorrent plaintiff then
accused the grandmother of downloading, for example, “Nude Nuns with
35
Big Guns.” A grandmother defendant with unsecured wireless who
receives such a settlement letter from an adult film company becomes the
36
poster child for the many protests in the P2P user community. The public
outcry against such behavior underscores the need to address the
normative concerns for parties on both sides of the BitTorrent litigation.
The BitTorrent litigation thus presents new challenges to the courts
faced with this application of joinder rules to “transactions [or]
occurrences” that exist solely in cyberspace and are coordinated only by a
P2P protocol. In the absence of actual intent to litigate the claims, the
plaintiffs’ strategy in joining a large number of defendants is contrary to
the purpose of judicial economy and trial convenience—the underlying
purpose served by joinder in the rules of civil procedure.

33. James DeBriyn, Note, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright
Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 79, 90–94 (2012) (describing how
plaintiffs use mass litigation as a business model).
34. This strategy of plaintiffs is not unique to P2P cases, nor is it new. See, e.g., Buck v. Robinson,
42 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (finding for the defendant in a case where the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers sued a restaurant for performing copyrighted songs); see also
Fight Copyright Trolls, http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
35. Keegan Hamilton, The Five Funniest Porn Titles Involved in BitTorrent Piracy Lawsuits, Seattle
Weekly (Aug. 11, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://blogs.seattleweekly.com/dailyweekly/2011/08/the_5_funniest_
porn_titles_bittorrent_piracy_lawsuits.php.
36. See, e.g., James Temple, Lawsuit Says Grandma Illegally Downloaded Porn, S.F. Chron, July
15, 2011, at D1.
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Currently experiencing a great influx of these cases, courts around
the country are divided as to whether early discovery should be granted
to a case in which tens, hundreds, or sometimes thousands of IP
addresses are joined together as putative defendants. The plaintiffs’
reliance on the detailed operation of the BitTorrent technology places
joinder rules of civil procedure front and center in a controversy to an
extent never before confronted by the courts. Some courts maintain that
joinder is proper at this early stage of the case, while others sever the
parties on the grounds of misjoinder or lack of personal jurisdiction. The
divide over whether to grant plaintiffs early discovery while joining a
large number of defendants exists not just between circuits but persists
even within the same federal district. The legal issue each district focuses
on differs slightly and thus sometimes leads to different grounds for the
various holdings. Nevertheless, the issue of joinder remains a recurring
37
theme in all circuits and is the focus of the analysis here.
This Note argues that the lack of a suitable means to resolve disputes
between copyright owners and consumers forces copyright owners and the
courts to apply civil procedure joinder rules in unintended ways. Part I
describes how the BitTorrent protocol differs from older P2P technologies
and how the current copyright enforcement scheme fails to address the
needs of copyright owners here. Part II examines how previous case law
involving older P2P technologies stands up to this new technology in the
context of the BitTorrent litigation. This Note argues that the lack of
consensus among district courts demonstrates that the Napster, Grokster,
and previous Doe cases do not provide adequate guidance for this
renewed struggle between copyright owners and P2P users. Lastly, Part
III concludes that a new copyright enforcement mechanism, such as an
alternative to lawsuits, is imperative not only to curtail the frustration
currently experienced by the district courts, but also to discontinue the
perverse application of civil procedure rules.

I. Background: The Rise of BitTorrent Litigation
A. Basics of BitTorrent Litigation
The rise of BitTorrent litigation coincided with a trend in P2P usage
that never existed before. While the number of music file transfers has
remained relatively constant since the RIAA litigation, the transfer of
38
TV shows and movies has grown tremendously. Relative to older

37. See, e.g., infra notes 155–196.
38. Eric Bangeman, P2P Traffic Shifts Away from Music, Towards Movies, Ars Technica (July 5,
2007, 9:26 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/07/p2p-traffic-shifts-away-from-musictowards-movies.ars.

Ren_18 (S. Alessi) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

5/24/2013 4:36 PM

FATE OF BITTORRENT JOHN DOES

1351

technologies, BitTorrent is well suited to handle the large files necessary
for TV shows and films, as it surpasses other existing P2P protocols by
accomplishing complete decentralization and mandating file sharing,
eliminating many of the common technological inefficiencies of older
39
P2P protocols.
Because BitTorrent is currently the top P2P protocol, data suggest
that the quantity of infringing activities it enables is staggering, reaching
40
over 99% of the P2P network traffic. Although there is controversy about
whether file sharing through BitTorrent leads to a reduction in profits to
41
copyright holders, it is undisputed that the majority of the traffic is
42
infringing. Owners of video and film copyrights are especially vulnerable,
and in 2010 they started to file lawsuits to recoup their financial losses.
Especially considering the economic woes that have befallen smaller
entertainment industry players in the past few years, the BitTorrent
plaintiffs might warrant more sympathy in comparison to the RIAA
43
plaintiffs—popularly viewed as big and oppressive music companies.
B. The File Distribution Scheme of Older P2P Protocols and
Its Problems
Older P2P protocols adopt certain aspects of the traditional clientserver model, where the client requests information from a server, which
44
in turn seeks to fulfill that request. Although a centralized server does
not store files in a P2P network, the server’s job is to match clients to
45
establish P2P connections upon a request. The server also indexes all of
the files available for download so as to properly translate a file request
46
into an appropriate connection. The peers share certain resources with
47
others in the network, such as files, storage space, or processing power.
As a network grows due to an increasing number of peers, not only are
more files available for search, but options to find a faster downloading
source also increase. On the other hand, since all queries are routed
through a central server, increased usage of the P2P network often leads

39. Ashwin R. Bharambe et al., Microsoft Research, Analyzing and Improving BitTorrent
Performance 2 (2005).
40. Bridy, supra note 11, at 709–10.
41. Stan J. Liebowitz, Economists Examine File-Sharing and Music Sales, in Industrial
Organization and the Digital Economy 145 (Gerhard Illing & Martin Peitz eds., 2006).
42. Bridy, supra note 11, at 709–10.
43. Steve Friess, Porn Industry Sweats Recession, Piracy, AolNews (Jan. 9, 2011, 10:39 AM),
http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/09/porn-industry-facing-hard-times-in-struggling-economy.
44. Patel, supra note 17, at 119.
45. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Software
located on the Napster servers maintains a ‘search index’ of Napster’s collective directory.”).
46. Id.
47. Col Perks & Tony Beveridge, Guide to Enterprise IT Architecture 190 (Springer 2003).
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to a bottleneck, decreasing the efficiency of searches and file transfers.
In an attempt to mitigate congestion at the central server, later
generations of P2P protocols adopted various decentralization schemes
49
that ranged from mini-servers to complete decentralization.
While congestion at a central server might be eliminated, the
decentralization of P2P protocols raised searching and connection issues.
A successful file transfer still requires searching for an available file owned
by a peer on the network and establishing a connection with that peer for
50
the duration of the transfer. Unstable connections and increased file
51
requests could still render the network unstable or incapacitated.
Another major inefficiency problem confronted by the P2P
communities is the lack of cooperation among peers sharing with each
52
other, a phenomenon called “free riding.” Users may derive a benefit
from downloading but may be reluctant to provide any uploads. Without
any incentive for users to gift, a P2P network can include up to 70% of
53
downloaders who never upload. An increasing number of downloaders
in a decentralized system can also create bottleneck situations akin to
those found in a centralized system—if they do not also correspondingly
contribute to sharing their files as uploads in the network.
C. The File Distribution Scheme of BitTorrent
Unlike the older file-sharing protocols, BitTorrent provides a better
user experience with faster download speed by increasing the efficiency
of file transfers through two main features: (1) network decentralization
and (2) mandatory simultaneous uploads and downloads in a group.
Incidentally, decentralization is also the main reason why BitTorrent
lacks a central infringement-inducing entity for purposes of lawsuits and
54
why it slips under the radar of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
BitTorrent elegantly solves the problems encountered by the older
generations of P2P, in large part, by mandating simultaneous downloads
and uploads in a “swarm-like” fashion. A BitTorrent peer not only

48. Yung-Ming Li et al., Analysis of Scale Effects in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 16 IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking 590, 590 (2008).
49. Bridy, supra note 11, at 699–700.
50. Stephanos Androutsellis-Theotokis & Diomidis Spinellis, A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Content
Distribution Technologies, 36 ACM Computing Surveys 335, 346 (2004).
51. Id.
52. Murat Karakaya et al., Free-Riding in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 13 IEEE Internet Computing
92, 92 (2009); Lei Liu et al., Experimental Investigation of a Peer-to-Peer-Based Architecture for
Emerging Consumer Grid Applications, 1 J. Optical Comms. & Networking 57, 57 (2009).
53. Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, First Monday (Oct. 2,
2000), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/792/701.
54. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010) (stating that §§ 512(c) and (h)
are only applicable to service providers that store data).
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downloads content, but is also mandated to serve content to other peers.
The system made this possible because a file in BitTorrent is broken
55
down into fragments called blocks. Uploading and downloading a file in
blocks led to two important characteristics of BitTorrent. First, a file
transfer connection is no longer restricted to peers who possess a
complete file. Uploading from one peer can immediately start once that
56
same peer downloads her first block of a file. As such, BitTorrent
protocol can mandate a peer who just finished downloading a first block
to upload that same first block during the same time the peer proceeds to
download her second block. Second, file transfer is not limited to a oneon-one transfer where one peer obtains her file solely from one other peer.
A peer can download different blocks of a single file from different peers
in a group. For example, a user may obtain the first block of the file from a
first peer, the second block from a second peer, etc. This collectivity of
57
peers sharing a file at any given time is called a “torrent” or “swarm.” A
peer in a torrent that has a complete file is called a “seed” while a peer that
58
is in the process of acquiring a file is a “leecher.” Every torrent requires
at least one seed to remain in the torrent and to serve the multiple
leechers. Aside from mandating simultaneous uploading and downloading,
there is also a mechanism by which peers providing a fast upload rate to
59
other users preferentially receive downloads. As such, the simultaneous
downloading in a swarm as well as the tit-for-tat feature allows the
60
network to grow sustainably.
Similar to how Internet surfers rely on Internet search engines to find
websites of interest, BitTorrent users rely on indexing websites, such as
61
PirateBay, to search for files. In a decentralized network like BitTorrent
where files are located in different peer locations, an indexing website
serves a similar function as a card catalog in a library to help users find
specific titles in the library stacks. These websites operate independently
from the BitTorrent protocol and provide indexing information to
BitTorrent users so the users can locate the swarm of peers sharing the file
62
of interest and establish a connection to the swarm. Accordingly, these
websites could be exposed to secondary liability based on the purpose of
inducing infringement and the profit-generating nature of their services.

55. Bram Cohen, Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent 1 (2003).
56. Id. at 2.
57. Raymond Lei Xia & Jogesh K. Muppala, A Survey of BitTorrent Performance, 12 IEEE
Comms. & Tutorials 140, 141.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 142.
60. Birdy, supra note 11, at 702.
61. Patel, supra note 17, at 137–42.
62. Id.
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Indeed, Congress has attempted to curb their activities. Unlike the
indexing websites, BitTorrent protocol itself could be difficult to shut
down because it exists merely as a software protocol that is completely
decentralized and without claimed ownership.
D. BitTorrent and Copyright Infringement
Research data and expert testimonies based on the Napster and
Grokster litigation support the conclusion that the majority of the P2P
traffic is infringing. The numbers presented to the courts in these older
lawsuits were either over 90% or high enough to support the plaintiffs’
64
claims. Copyright infringement culpability is no different for BitTorrent.
One study found that only about 1% of the files in a BitTorrent sample
65
were non-infringing, while another found that only 0.3% of the files
66
were non-infringing.
Published numbers suggest a significant loss of industry revenue, tax
revenue, and jobs because of online piracy. However, the connection
between massive job losses and infringement is controversial, as many
studies showing this are supported or affiliated with the music industry.
The metrics and assumptions inherent in the studies, such as directly
correlating instances of piracy to lost sales of a copyrighted work, are
67
questionable. Regardless of whether the studies correctly quantify the
economic repercussions of P2P copyright infringement, the large amount
of files illegally downloaded via BitTorrent does not appear to be
68
disputed.
Centralized content distribution systems, the staple of the old P2P
networks, provided static and easily identifiable targets for litigation and
69
other enforcement efforts. Current copyright enforcement thus works
70
best when infringing work is fixed on central servers. The expansive,

63. Id.; see Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th Cong.
(2012) (allowing the U.S. International Trade Commission to adjudicate cases involving foreign
websites whose primary purpose is piracy); Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(a)
(2011) (targeting Internet sites used for copyright infringement); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th Cong.
§ 3 (2011) (investing the attorney general with the power to combat rogue websites).
64. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922–23 (2005).
65. Jackie Cheng, BitTorrent Consensus: About 99% of Files Copyright Infringing, Ars Technica
http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2010/01/bittorrent-census-about-99-of-files-copyright-infringing.ars.
66. Robert Layton & Paul Watters, Internet Commerce Sec. Lab., Investigation into the
Extent of Infringing Content on BitTorrent Networks 1, 7 (2010).
67. Bridy, supra note 11, at 711; Stuart Corner, AFACT Repeats Claims: Over 90 Percent of
BitTorrent Files Breach Copyright, ITWire (Sept. 20, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.itwire.com/it-policynews/regulation/49875-afact-repeats-claims-over-90-percent-of-bittorrent-files-breach-copyright.
68. Bridy, supra note 11, at 709–10.
69. Id. at 705 (citing Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 653, 658 (2003)).
70. Bridy, supra note 11, at 716 (citing Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of
Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 15, 41 (2006) (“[The
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ever-changing BitTorrent community of anonymous members, together
with the decentralized approach, makes it very difficult to shut down
71
BitTorrent swarms. By eschewing a central server, BitTorrent minimizes
its vulnerability—in distinction to the vulnerability of Napster—to the
threats of existing copyright enforcement. Without a proper enforcement
scheme or recourse outside of litigation to subpoena identification of
72
infringers, filing a lawsuit became a copyright owner’s only answer.

II. Massive John Doe Litigation
A. Is Expedited Discovery Proper?
A copyright-owner plaintiff who seeks to identify defendants known
only by their IP addresses must apply for discovery in order to proceed
with infringement claims. Rule 26(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure forbids a party from seeking discovery before a Rule 26(f)
73
conference unless the court orders otherwise. A Rule 26(f) conference
is an opportunity for parties to meet in order to develop a discovery plan.
74
The plan will then be submitted to the court for review. In a John Doe
litigation case, a Rule 26(f) conference is not possible because defendants
have not yet been identified. Only when the court permits a Rule 26(d)
exception for expedited discovery can the plaintiff discover the
defendants’ identities and accordingly name the parties as defendants.
Based on the express wording of Rule 26(d) and the want of
pertinent appellate decisions, district courts wield broad discretion to
determine whether to grant expedited discovery prior to a Rule 26(f)
conference. Generally, a decision “to deny discovery will not be disturbed
except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in
75
actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” Only if

Digital Millennium Copyright Act] was designed to address a mainly centralized architecture. . . .
Peer-to-peer architecture, by contrast, is decentralized and allows users to search for files stored in the
libraries of other users.”)); see Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010) (stating that
§§ 512(c) and (h) are only applicable to service providers that store data).
71. Patel, supra note 17, at 121.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (stating that §§ 512(c) and (h) are only applicable to service providers that
store data).
73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2).
75. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan,
287 F.3d 1193, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002)); see Ritchie Special Credit Invs., Ltd. v. U.S. Tr., 620 F.3d 847, 853
(8th Cir. 2010) (holding that whether to “deny expedited discovery [is] committed to the discretion of
the bankruptcy court” and that decisions would not be reversed “unless that court has abused its
discretion”); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
despite having considerable latitude in determining the scope of discovery, the district court abused its
discretion “when the discovery is so limited as to affect a party’s substantial rights” (citing Goldman v.
Checker Taxi Co., 325 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1963))).
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there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
76
different had discovery been allowed can prejudice be established.
Exercises of broad discretion have led district courts to develop
different standards that govern whether a court should grant expedited
discovery: the Notaro standard, the reasonableness standard, and the
77
good cause standard. These different standards result from practices
that exist in different federal districts, and none have yet to be adopted
consistently or exclusively in any one circuit.
The Notaro standard is similar to that required in a preliminary
injunction: (1) irreparable injury, (2) some probability of success on the
merits, (3) some connection between expedited discovery and avoidance
of irreparable injury, and (4) some evidence that the injury that will
result without expedited discovery looms greater than the injury that the
78
defendant will suffer if the expedited relief is granted.
Applying the Notaro standard, plaintiffs in these BitTorrent cases
assert irreparable injury because ISPs keep log files of subscriber
79
activities for only limited periods of time before erasing the data.
Accordingly, if they do not seek discovery in time to match identification
information to the IP addresses that correspond to infringers, they lose
80
their only means to seek redress for their injuries. The presumption that
plaintiffs suffered injury because of illegal downloads, however, is
controversial. Analogizing to previous lessons from the music industry,
the alleged injury could be specious because not all illegal downloads
81
represent sales that copyright owners would have actually made.
However, it was the testimonies of music executives and research studies
from the music industry about such injury that ultimately persuaded the

76. Martel v. Cnty. of L.A., 56 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1995).
77. Jesse N. Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery from Courts & Returning It to FRCP 26(d)(1):
Using a Doctrine’s Forgotten History to Achieve Legitimacy, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 651, 661 (2011).
78. Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403, 405 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying the test to see if leave can
be granted for the taking of depositions while recognizing that the test is from assessing the propriety
of a preliminary injunction); cf. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (applying the standard in
a case involving a preliminary injunction).
79. See, e.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–130, No. C-11-3826 DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132449, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–11, No. 11-cv-01776-AW, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128889, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2011) (noting that ISPs keep “temporary internal logs
that record the date, time, and customer identity for each IP address serviced”); Hard Drive Prods.,
Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119333, at *6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011)
(“ISPs . . . keep the logs of these addresses for only a short period of time.”).
80. Cf. Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. § 4
(2011) (“A commercial provider of an electronic communication service shall retain for a period of at
least one year a log of the temporarily assigned network addresses . . . .”).
81. See, e.g., Liebowitz, supra note 41; Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (2004); cf. OECD Report, Digital Broadband
Content: Music, DSTI/ICCP/IE(2004)12/FINAL (Jun. 8, 2005); Opderbeck, supra note 14.

Ren_18 (S. Alessi) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

FATE OF BITTORRENT JOHN DOES

5/24/2013 4:36 PM

1357

82

Napster court. Given this legal backdrop, the rights owners should not
have an impediment in establishing irreparable injury.
Turning to the second and third prongs of the Notaro standard, the
plaintiffs should also have no difficulty proving (2) some probability to
succeed on the merits and (3) the connection between expedited
discovery and avoidance of injury. The plaintiffs have started using
forensic software, which has allowed investigators to observe the
distribution of video (using the BitTorrent protocol) that is linked to
individual defendants’ IP addresses. This forensic software further allows
83
investigators to verify that the distributed file is the registered work.
Considering that the language, “some probability” and “some
connection,” in these two prongs reflects general guidelines without a
requirement for a heightened standard for specificity, plaintiffs are able
to allege enough at the pleading stage to demonstrate the probability and
connection needed to proceed.
The last prong of the Notaro standard requires balancing the injury to
the plaintiff without expedited discovery against the injury suffered by the
84
defendant from expedited discovery. Courts’ application of this prong to
decide whether to grant early discovery follows how the standard has been
85
used in preliminary injunction cases. A typical situation where this prong
can support granting early discovery is when a party wants to depose a
person who would soon become unavailable. The objective here is to
insulate defendants from “unfair” discovery for fear that defendants would
86
not have enough time to prepare for the case and to hire an attorney.
Given the objective served by the last prong of the Notaro standard,
the BitTorrent plaintiffs should also meet no obstacles in their application
for expedited discovery. In comparison to cases where the expedited
discovery involves a deposition, the balancing inquiry in the BitTorrent
cases favors plaintiffs. First, their discovery request merely seeks a
subpoena to order ISPs to reveal identification information. Second, the
defendants have yet to be identified and the burden of discovery
87
production rests on the ISP and not on the defendant. Third, the courts
often narrowly fashion the scope of the expedited discovery to allow an

82. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015–17 (9th Cir. 2001).
83. E.g., Pac. Century Int’l, Ltd. v. Does 1–48, No. C 11-3823 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116432, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011).
84. Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
85. E.g., Crown Crafts, Inc. v. Aldrich, 148 F.R.D. 151, 152 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (recognizing that
courts have borrowed the Notaro standard for “the test for granting a preliminary injunction and
applied it to requests for expedited discovery”).
86. Panoff, supra note 77, at 663–64.
87. But cf. Call of the Wild Movie, L.L.C. v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.D.C. 2011)
(involving an ISP filing a motion to quash the subpoena because of the undue burden it faces with
compliance).
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opportunity for any defendants to contest the subpoena. Although
89
defendants’ rights to anonymity and the expense required in contesting
the subpoena could be an issue, plaintiffs here have made a prima facie
case for their injury. They also lack alternative means to garner
90
information necessary to proceed with their claims. Therefore, the
recognizable injury to the defendants is relatively minimal, and an
application of the Notaro standard in these BitTorrent cases favors
granting limited expedited discovery to plaintiffs.
The reasonableness standard is similar to the Notaro standard and
91
does not compel a different result. The reasonableness standard takes
into account all surrounding circumstances, including (1) whether a
preliminary injunction hearing is pending, (2) the proposed discovery’s
scope, (3) the purpose for requesting expedited discovery, (4) the burden
placed on the defendant to comply with the requests, and (5) how far in
advance of the typical discovery process the request was made. Since the
Notaro standard originated as a test to be applied in a preliminary
injunction case, courts developed the reasonableness standard as an
alternative to avoid confounding a determination for expedited discovery
with that for a preliminary injunction. Otherwise, in a case where there is
an expedited discovery in connection with a preliminary injunction,
92
courts find it less than ideal to apply the Notaro standard twice. Here,
all the facts pertaining to the BitTorrent plaintiffs in favor of expedited
discovery under the Notaro standard also would apply with equal force
under the reasonableness standard.
The final standard conditions expedited discovery on a finding of
“good cause.” “Good cause” may be found where the “need for expedited
discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the
93
prejudice to the responding party.” Based on Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo
88. E.g., Pac. Century Int’l, Ltd. v. Does 1–48, No. C 11-3823 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116432, at *22–23 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Camelot Distrib. Group v. Does, No. 2:11-cv-02432 GEB
KJN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108816, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011); Pac. Century Int’l Ltd. v. Does
1–129, No. C11-03681 HRL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86779, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011); Call of the
Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
89. E.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does, No. 11-7248, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41645, at *22–26 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 23, 2012) (refusing to enter a protective order to allow the defendants to proceed anonymously);
cf. Sunlust Pictures, L.L.C. v. Cisa, No. 12-cv-00656-CMA-KMT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150835, at *8–
9 (D. Colo. Oct. 19, 2012) (allowing movant to proceed anonymously but noting that “Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(a), and Rule 17(a) specifically states that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest”).
90. E.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 352–53.
91. See Panoff, supra note 77, at 668.
92. Id. at 664–66.
93. Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see PodNers, L.L.C. v. N. Feed & Bean, 204 F.R.D. 675, 676 (D. Colo. 2002) (“[I] order expedited discovery
upon a showing of good cause.”); Yokohama Tire Corp. v. Dealers Tire Supply, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 612,
614 (D. Ariz. 2001) (“[T]he [c]ourt adopts a good cause standard to warrant the granting of any
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Electron America, Inc., the good cause standard allows a trial court to
grant expedited discovery where the Notaro standard would not, and the
main reason for this broader discretion is the lack of an “irreparable
94
injury” requirement. The Semitool court found that although the plaintiff
did not allege “irreparable injury,” its argument pertaining to conservation
of “party and court resources” was persuasive, for the benefit to the
“administration of justice” outweighs the burden on the defendant. This
standard is thus consistent with the general rule allowing trial courts wide
95
discretion to manage discovery.
Some district courts apply a modified “good cause” standard when
anonymous Internet users are named as Doe defendants. For example,
many judges in the Northern District of California break down the
analysis further into four requirements as set forth in Columbia
Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com: (1) The plaintiff can identify the missing
party with sufficient specificity that the court can determine that the
defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court;
(2) the plaintiff has identified all previous steps taken to locate the elusive
defendant; (3) the plaintiff’s suit against the defendant could withstand a
motion to dismiss; and (4) the plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a
reasonable likelihood of identifying the defendant through discovery such
96
that service of process would be possible.
Because the good cause standard affords trial judges broader
discretion to grant expedited discovery than the Notaro standard, it is an
easier standard for the BitTorrent plaintiffs to meet. Even if one were to
apply the situation at hand to the four requirements in Seescandy.com used
in the Northern District of California, the BitTorrent plaintiffs should be
able to meet the requirements. First, the plaintiffs would have submitted a
list of IP addresses corresponding to the infringers found to be
downloading their copyrighted works. Second, plaintiffs would have
explained in the complaints how they went about identifying and verifying
these infringing activities using their forensic software, as well as provided
declarations to that effect. Third, these IP addresses are the key to
locating the defendants. All these facts, as alleged by the plaintiffs,
should also satisfy the essential elements of a copyright infringement

expedited discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) scheduling conference . . . .”).
94. Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276.
95. Id.
96. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see Sony Music
Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the Second Circuit
adopts a set of similar factors: (1) a concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm, (2) the
specificity of the discovery request, (3) the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed
information, (4) a central need for the subpoenaed information to advance the claim, and (5) the
party’s expectation of privacy).
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claim at the pleading stage to survive a motion to dismiss. Finally, as for
the likelihood of being able to identify the defendant through such
discovery, ISPs assign a unique IP address to each subscriber and retain
records of subscriber activity. The information sought from the ISPs—
such as the names and addresses of the subscribers—will enable plaintiffs
98
to serve defendants.
One might expect plaintiffs to fall short of the good cause standard,
however, when probing deeper into the third prong of Seescandy.com:
that the plaintiff’s suit against the defendant can withstand a motion to
dismiss. Facially, it seems that the plaintiffs have duly fulfilled this
requirement because all the elements of the copyright infringement claim
are adequately alleged in the complaint. The evidence generated by the
plaintiffs’ investigative efforts also corroborates the allegations. However,
the plaintiffs’ joinder of multiple defendants, each represented by an IP
address, warrants further analysis under the third prong because if joinder
is improper a court is free to drop one or more parties that are joined.
Improper joinder thus can lead to dismissing the action against one or
more parties. Since Seescandy.com requires that the suit against the
defendant be able to withstand a motion to dismiss, granting expedited
discovery would hinge on whether the BitTorrent plaintiffs have properly
joined the defendants.
One question before proceeding to the joinder inquiry is whether
misjoinder actually results in a dismissal as contemplated by the third
99
prong of Seescandy.com. The Ninth Circuit in Gillespie v. Civilett, the
case to which Seescandy.com resorted for its reasoning, asserts that early
discovery should be granted unless a “complaint would be dismissed on
other grounds,” while citing to cases in which discovery should have been
granted because the complaints alleged facts under which a
100
meritorious claim might be proved. Seescandy.com then elaborated on
Gillespie and explained that the requirement of having a suit be able to
“withstand a motion to dismiss” serves to protect “against the misuse of ex
parte procedures to invade the privacy” of those who might not have done

97. See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 11-04397 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128033, at *4–6
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011); Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. C 11-02768 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128030, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011); MCGIP, L.L.C. v. Does 1–30, No. C11-03680 HRL, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88790, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011).
98. E.g., First Time Videos, L.L.C. v. Does 1–95, No. C 11-3822 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116434, at *4–12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011).
99. Gillespie v. Civilett, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980).
100. Id. (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978)); see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.
v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (holding that discovery is not strictly restricted to the merits of the
case but should be allowed to litigate jurisdictional issues); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express
Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430–31 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977) (vacating the lower court’s refusal to grant discovery
because it is important in aiding a determination of jurisdiction).
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101

anything wrong. The court held that a “conclusory pleading will never
be sufficient” and emphasized that a plaintiff must have “standing to
102
pursue an action against [a] defendant.” Accordingly, the specific
concern for both Gillespie and Seescandy.com was whether the complaint
alleged sufficient facts for a legal remedy and whether the plaintiff had
standing. In light of this context, dismissing a case based on misjoinder is
not exactly the type of dismissal contemplated by Gillespie and
Seescandy.com. If Gillespie and Seescandy.com circumscribe dismissals to
situations where insufficient facts were alleged for a legal remedy or
where there is a lack of standing, the BitTorrent plaintiffs’ claims could
survive the Seescandy.com test and should be able to procure expedited
discovery.
Nevertheless, a trial court armed with the broad discretion to
manage discovery is free to examine misjoinder as a ground for
severance without being constrained to a narrow interpretation of
Gillespie and Seescandy.com. Severance does not necessarily lead to
dismissal, as Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
states that misjoinder is not “a ground for dismissing an action” though
103
“the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Despite
this facial prohibition of dismissal based on misjoinder, a severance of the
parties in BitTorrent cases practically results in dismissal. Because
dismissal against the dropped parties is without prejudice, it is now the
plaintiffs’ prerogative to file new suits against every one of those dropped
individuals.
However, it is not in the plaintiffs’ interest to lose the economies of
scale by filing one suit against each individual defendant in response to a
court-ordered severance. It is a well-known business model in cases like
this that the plaintiffs would be unlikely to pursue the claims to
104
judgment. Rather, once identification information is in hand, a plaintiff
will send out a letter informing potential defendants of the advantages of
105
settlement and the disadvantages thereof. Joinder is essential to
maintain low filing and overhead costs in order to make filing these

101. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579.
102. Id. at 579–80.
103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.
104. See, e.g., Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1–27, Civ. No. 07-162-B-W, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6241, at *18 (D. Me. Jan. 25, 2008) (rejecting the argument to adopt a heightened pleading standard
even if plaintiffs are “using litigation . . . solely as a discovery mechanism, without actually intending to
pursue their claims to judgment”).
105. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Springsteen Pissed at ASCAP for Implying He Instigated Lawsuit
Against Pub; Demands His Name Removed, Techdirt (Feb. 5, 2010, 10:13 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20100204/1525198055.shtml; USCG v. The People, Elec. Frontier Found., https://www.eff.org/
cases/uscg-v-people (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
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lawsuits worthwhile to copyright owners, and so satisfying joinder is an
important hurdle the BitTorrent plaintiffs need to overcome.
B. Is Joinder Proper?
Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the
joinder of defendants if both of the following conditions are met:
“(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in
the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question
106
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”
Designed to enhance judicial economy and trial convenience, the rule
encourages courts to entertain the broadest possible scope of action with
respect to joinder of parties, claims, and remedies that is consistent with
107
fairness to the parties. As a determination on expedited discovery, a
trial court similarly wields broad discretion in deciding whether parties
108
are properly joined.
Whether there is “any question of law or fact common to all
defendants” is not disputed because the BitTorrent plaintiffs often have
adequately pled liability under copyright infringement with evidence
supporting the fact that all the defendants downloaded the same
109
copyrighted work. The remaining issue is whether the joined defendants’
conduct arises “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
110
transactions or occurrences.”
The doctrine of secondary liability that exists in copyright
infringement cases can bolster the proposition that “same transaction [or]
occurrence” should include a defendant in BitTorrent cases who knew or
had reason to know that her act contributed to infringement. Courts have
found contributory infringement based on the “doctrine that one who
knowingly participates or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally

106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
107. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); see Mosley v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332–33 (8th Cir. 1974); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977).
108. See, e.g., Warner v. Rossignol, 513 F.2d 678, 684 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b)
commits sound discretion to the trial court as to whether to grant or deny separate trials); Mosley, 497
F.2d at 1332 (citing Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir. 1957)
(holding that the court has broad discretion in matters of Rule 20(b) and Rule 42(b) and that its ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion)).
109. E.g., Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. 12-10760-FDS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159538, at *6 (D.
Mass. Nov. 5, 2012) (“There is no question that there exist at least some questions of law or fact
common to all defendants.”); Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–28, No. 12-cv-2599-WJM-MEH, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144501, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 5, 2012) (noting that users of twenty-eight IP addresses
were identified that had downloaded a file with a specific hash number associated with the copyrighted
work and that these “28 IP addresses were allegedly assigned to the 28 John Doe Defendants”).
110. E.g., Third Degree Films, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159538, at *6.
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111

liable with the prime tortfeasor.” To successfully assert contributory
infringement, a third-party—that is, a peer in a swarm—must directly
infringe the plaintiff’s copyright, the defendant must materially contribute
to the infringement, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
112
knew or had reason to know that the third party was directly infringing.
The main argument that all the joined defendants are acting
concertedly “in the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences” rests on BitTorrent’s unique method of file sharing. A
plaintiff’s typical complaint lists a number of IP addresses, ranging from
about twenty to more than a thousand, each corresponding to a Doe
113
defendant that the plaintiff knew participated in a BitTorrent swarm.
Next to each IP address is a timestamp indicating the date and time at
which forensic software observed that the IP address was involved in the
114
file transfer. The plaintiff then verifies that the transferred file is their
copyrighted work by downloading and watching part or the entire video
115
file. The plaintiffs also allege that the same hash value was shared
116
among all defendants’ files. A hash value is an alphanumeric value
117
representing the “digital fingerprint” of a file. The same hash value
among the files is evidence that the files are copied or downloaded from
118
a single source —the seeder of a swarm. As described in Part I,
BitTorrent protocol mandatorily makes every user a provider of a file to
119
other peers the moment it downloads a small piece of a file. Since each
120
participant in the swarm acts as both a downloader and an uploader, the
nature of the swarm is consistent with the notion of “same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”
1. Precedential Value of the RIAA Litigation
Courts have looked to the previous massive Doe litigation brought
by RIAA on behalf of the music industry for guidance because the
RIAA cases are similar to the BitTorrent cases in many aspects. The
111. NCR Corp. v. Korala Assocs. Ltd., 512 F.3d 807, 816 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gershwin Publ’g
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)); see Salton, Inc. v. Philips
Domestic Appliances & Pers. Care B.V., 391 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying joint and several
liability to federal copyright infringement).
112. Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 837 (3d Cir. 2007); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
113. See infra notes 144–145, 163–177.
114. See infra note 185.
115. E.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566 (E.D. Pa. 2011); New Sensations,
Inc. v. Does, No. C-11-2770-MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94909, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011).
116. See Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, 285 F.R.D. 273. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); infra note 127.
117. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546–47 (D. Md. 2007).
118. Id.
119. See supra Part I.
120. See supra Part I.
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RIAA cases, however, failed to produce a consensus on the issue of
joinder. On one hand, courts that granted expedited discovery in the
RIAA cases either postponed the issue of joinder for later analysis or
121
found proper joinder at the time of the litigation. One argument is that
having the defendants joined could even favor the defendants now that
122
they can resort to a joint defense. On the other hand, many courts
denied joinder, as the only factual allegation connecting all the
defendants was that they used the same ISP or were connected to the
123
same network on a university campus. RIAA would often attempt to
join multiple defendants, each of whom would be implicated in infringing
on different songs that belonged to different plaintiffs. Given this lack of
connection among defendants and without more facts to relate the
defendants in the “same transaction [or] occurrence,” courts concluded
124
that being on the same network was insufficient for joinder.
The BitTorrent cases present several important distinguishing
125
features from the previous RIAA cases that denied joinder. First, all
BitTorrent users in a swarm both download and upload from each other
simultaneously. Simultaneous file sharing in a swarm is absent from the
P2P file-sharing protocols implicated in many of the RIAA cases involving
older technologies, so the RIAA plaintiffs could not rely on the operation
126
of the P2P protocol to support joinder. Second, the BitTorrent cases

121. Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1–17, No. 07-6197-HO, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106461, at *7–8
(D. Or. Sept. 25, 2008) (holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is not the exclusive
mechanism for the issuance of a subpoena and that the university must comply with discovery requests);
see Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1–12, No. 1:08-cv-1241-OWW-GSA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82548,
at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2008) (finding that some courts have denied the requests for expedited
discovery while others have granted them).
122. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Does, No. 1:08-CV-765 (GTS/RFT), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12159, at
*28 (N.D.N.Y Feb. 18, 2009). See generally Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense,
93 Calif. L. Rev. 685 (2005); Jonathan Reich, The Class Defense: Why Dispersed Intellectual Property
Defendants Need Procedural Protections, 2010 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 9 (2010).
123. See, e.g., infra notes 126, 128.
124. See infra notes 126, 128.
125. E.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does, No. 11-7248, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41645, at *12 n.2 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 23, 2012) (finding the BitTorrent cases factually distinguishable from cases involving older
technologies).
126. See, e.g., IO Grp., Inc. v. Does, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133717, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (finding misjoinder because the only factual allegation connecting the defendants
was the allegation that they all used the “eDonkey 2000” P2P network to reproduce and distribute
plaintiff’s copyrighted works); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 07-1515, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27170,
at *19 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2008) (finding misjoinder because none “of the Defendants downloaded
and/or distributed the same copyrighted recordings belonging to the same set of Plaintiffs, and each of
the Defendants accessed a different number of audio files on different dates”); Laface Records, L.L.C.
v. Does 1–38, 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14544, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) (granting
severance because using the same ISP as well as some of the same P2P networks is not adequate for
joinder); BMG Music v. Does, No. 3:06-cv-01579-MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53237, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
July 31, 2006) (finding misjoinder because the only connection between defendants was the fact that
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implicate only one plaintiff alleging the copyright infringement of a
single copyrighted work that is identified by a unique hash value shared
127
among all the joined defendants’ files. In contrast, the RIAA cases
often involved two or more plaintiffs alleging that the defendants
128
downloaded illegal copies of multiple sound recordings. Accordingly,
the circumstances surrounding the BitTorrent cases provide a stronger
logical relationship among the claims against each defendant than
129
previously asserted.
The key question is whether the intrinsic nature of the BitTorrent
file-sharing scheme imputes liability to its users where the older P2P
protocols did not. There are arguments on both sides. On the one hand,
the interconnected nature necessary for BitTorrent usage can also be
found in older generations of P2P protocols. For example, using an older
generation of P2P file sharing, a user would “(1) index files into shared
directories on a specific computer that can be searched for and transferred
to other users; (2) search for files stored on other users’ computers;
(3) transfer exact copies of files from one computer to another . . . ; and (4)
130
allow [other] users to further distribute the files” in the network. These
activities could very well connect all P2P users into an enterprise akin to

defendants allegedly used the same ISP, Covad Communications, to conduct the infringing acts);
Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 04 Civ. 2289 (RWS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23560, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004) (finding no logical relations to support a joinder because the only common
questions of fact concerned the operation of NYU’s network and the Fast Track network);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Adrian, No. 03 C 6366, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8922, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004)
(stating that each defendant, apparently acting on his own and at different times, purchased various
types of offending devices which were used in different ways); DIRECTV v. Loussaert, 218 F.R.D.
639, 643–44 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (granting severance because having the offending device shipped
through a common mailing facility did not satisfy the same transaction requirement of Rule 20).
127. But cf. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–44, No. JFM 8:12-cv-00020, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47686, at *21 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2012) (“[W]hether the joined Doe defendants downloaded one work, or
twenty, does not change the separate and discrete nature of their activity.”).
128. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Doe, No. 04-650, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8457, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2,
2004) (finding no connection to maintain joinder, especially when, for example, one Doe is alleged to
have infringed nine works held by five plaintiffs and another is alleged to have infringed ten works owned
by a different group of plaintiffs); Interscope Records v. Does 1–25, No. 6:04-cv-197-Orl-22DAB, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (finding misjoinder because none of the
defendants disseminated the same copyrighted material or songs belonging to the same set of plaintiffs).
129. Some courts in the RIAA cases did note that if one defendant was to actually obtain the file
from another defendant, there could be support for proper joinder. See, e.g., Fonovisa, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27170, at *17 (noting that facts tending to show that one or more of the defendants had
actually downloaded songs from another defendant could conceivably link the defendants or show
they acted in concert); Interscope Records, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *10 (holding that joinder
was improper due to failure “to show how or which of the Defendants have actually downloaded
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted songs from another Defendant (which could conceivably link such Defendants)
as opposed to any other users of the systems”).
130. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Does 1–16, No. 1-08-CV-765 (GTS/RFT), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12159, at *4 (N.D.N.Y Feb. 18, 2009).
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conspiracy. Thus there should be no reason to find jointly shared liability
in one but not the other.
On the other hand, BitTorrent coordinates each of the user activities
mentioned above differently from older P2P protocols, and this
coordination could support joinder while the older P2P protocols would
not. First, in an older protocol, each of the user activities is often attributed
to a different user, while BitTorrent mandates all users who download a
file also be an uploader. More importantly, each user in an older protocol
decides to undertake an activity on the network only on a voluntary basis.
Second, making a file available and transferring a file from one location to
another does not necessarily occur simultaneously for older protocols.
Accordingly, it is understandable why joinder could be an insurmountable
obstacle for plaintiffs battling older generations of P2P file sharing without
evidence that any of the defendants’ activities were coordinated.
The mandatory requirement that BitTorrent users simultaneously
upload and download a file in a swarm can be persuasive that the filesharing activities of different users impute joint liability on everybody in
the swarm. Based strictly on legal grounds, the BitTorrent plaintiffs here
have provided enough evidence to obtain joinder for early discovery.
Rule 20 merely requires that the subject matter is “in the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Based
on what the plaintiffs have alleged with respect to the method of the file
sharing unique to BitTorrent, all the facts support the “same transaction”
131
test. The nature of the swarm is no different from a group of people who
are physically present to conspire in sharing an item. There is no reason
why the same actions happening over cyberspace should be subject to a
different joinder standard from activities that happen in a confined
physical space—for example, a room where conspirers are physically
present. Lastly, the fact that the presence of more peers in a BitTorrent
swarm increases the likelihood of a successful download—and that one
less peer can make the file transfer less efficient—strongly supports the
132
conspiracy characteristics of the BitTorrent file-sharing activities.
Setting aside the file distribution scheme, a closer examination of
actual human conduct may undercut the conspiracy theory necessary to
the argument for joinder in BitTorrent cases. A typical BitTorrent user
starts a computer program that runs the BitTorrent file-sharing protocol,
finds a swarm to leech on, and starts a file transfer. One user probably
does not make any direct human communication with any other users in
the swarm—such as texting, phone calls, or Internet chats—in relation to
131. See supra Part II.B.
132. Boy Racer v. Does, No. C 11-02834 LHK (PSG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86746, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (describing the plaintiff’s attempt to show a greater extent of “cooperation and
concerted action” among BitTorrent users than among users of other protocols).
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the file transfer, and does not know ahead of time the sources of the file
133
from which she receives her copy. Some courts express doubt as to how
timestamps corresponding to infringing activities that span several days
134
or even months could reflect the same transaction or occurrence. One
could even argue that the BitTorrent user lacks mental culpability because
she does not know how the BitTorrent protocol creates a copy of the file
for her. Merely looking at individual users in a swarm as persons, the
human conduct of a BitTorrent user is no different from that of a user of
an older P2P protocol. Accordingly, human conduct alone would not
satisfy the traditional notions of “same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences.” What would make their activities those of the
“same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”
exists solely in the inner workings of the BitTorrent protocol. The protocol
makes all the human conduct that would traditionally qualify an enterprise
as a conspiracy unnecessary. Regardless of whether a user might
knowingly be infringing on a copyright, it is less clear if clicking a mouse
reflects an informed decision to participate in an activity that would
135
ultimately lead to joint liability.
2.

Fundamental Fairness in Joinder

Even if the BitTorrent plaintiffs were to meet the two conditions set
forth in Rule 20(a)(2), courts in several circuits have developed
“fundamental fairness” as an additional requirement in a motion to sever
136
or join a party. Relevant factors in a “fundamental fairness” analysis

133. See, e.g., SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12 Civ. 3925 (SAS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84279, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012) (finding that there is no allegation that the defendants “communicated or
conspired with each other about their transactions”).
134. Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–131, 280 F.R.D. 493, 498 (D. Ariz. 2012) (finding that a
particular swarm “can last for many months,” during which time “the initial participants may never
overlap with later participants”); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe 1–58, No. 3:11cv531-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120235, at *5–6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d
1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that activities occurring on different days and times over a twomonth period show that Doe Defendants may not have been physically present in the swarm on the
exact same day and time). But cf. Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, 12 Civ. 2954 (NRB), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120855, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2012) (finding that eighty-eight days “does not undermine
the interrelated nature of their actions,” as the “law of joinder does not have as a precondition that
there be temporal distance or temporal overlap” (citing Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–21, No. 11 Civ
1523, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57962 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2012))).
135. E.g., Hard Drive Prods., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (“The bare fact that a Doe clicked on a
command to participate in the BitTorrent Protocol does not mean that they were part of the
downloading by unknown hundreds or thousands of individuals . . . .”). But cf. Tim Wu, When Code
Isn’t Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 679, 707–08 (2003) (suggesting that computer software engineers design
codes to take advantage of “loopholes and ambiguities in legal systems”).
136. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that courts must
decide whether permissive joinder would “‘comport with the principles of fundamental fairness’ or
would result in prejudice to either side” (citing Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d
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include: (1) possible prejudice that may result to any of the parties in the
litigation; (2) possible jury confusion; (3) the motive that the moving party
has in seeking the motion at issue; (4) the closeness of the relationship
between the parties to be joined; (5) the effect of the motion on the court’s
jurisdiction; (6) the presence of notice to parties; and (7) judicial
137
efficiency. This analysis highlights the discretionary authority embodied
in Rule 20 and also incorporates the principles propounded by Rule
42(b) that allow courts to order separate trials for “convenience, to avoid
138
prejudice, or to expedite and economize.”
While the BitTorrent plaintiffs might have a good legal reason to
join multiple defendants based on the concerted nature of their actions
mandated by the BitTorrent protocol, the “fundamental fairness”
requirement could prove fatal to the attempt to maintain joinder. First,
defendants could suffer prejudice having to litigate their cases together
despite having different evidence and testimony specific to their
139
circumstances. Each defendant would have to serve pleadings on other
140
defendants and accommodate them during depositions. The prejudice
is especially acute when many defendants reside out of the district or
141
even out of the state. The fact that most defendants would appear pro
142
se creates additional burdens at each step of the litigation process.
Second, joining multiple defendants could greatly undermine judicial
economy and trial convenience, which are the original purposes of
143
Rule 20. Assuming that joinder can efficiently resolve certain aspects of
the case, there may be other logistical complications that outweigh the
benefits of joinder. For example, courts facing BitTorrent cases often raise
the concern that the many defendants sought to be joined creates a

1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980)); McIntyre v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(asserting that joinder should comport with the principles of fundamental fairness and refusing to find
plaintiff’s motive in adding parties was fundamentally unfair to defendant); Intercon Research
Assocs., Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 1982) (dismissing Dresser Industries as a
defendant in order to ensure fundamental fairness to all parties).
137. See, e.g., Desert Empire Bank, 623 F.2d at 1375 (noting that one other consideration is the
delay of the moving party in seeking an amendment to his pleadings); Wynn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 234 F.
Supp. 2d 1067, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“[E]ven if Plaintiffs could somehow meet the minimum legal
requirements for joinder, this Court would then exercise its discretion . . . to sever for at least two
reasons: (1) to prevent jury confusion and judicial inefficiency, and (2) to prevent unfair prejudice to
the Employer and Agency Defendants.”).
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
139. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
140. Id.
141. On the Cheap, L.L.C. v. Does 1–5011, No. C10-4472 BZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99831, at
*10–11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (pointing out the difficulties out-of-state and out-of-district
defendants would face if required to appear in this court).
142. Hard Drive Prods., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
143. See, e.g., League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th
Cir. 1977).
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144

daunting task for case management. The different ISPs and factual
circumstances surrounding the alleged infringing activities unique to each
defendant could result in different motion filings and defenses, all of which
145
would have to be resolved one at a time. The problem is especially stark
in cases where plaintiffs seek to join thousands of defendants. Finding a
courtroom to hold that many parties for a case management conference
146
provides a glimpse of potential logistical complications.
Third, joining multiple defendants can affect the court’s jurisdiction
because courts may not have personal jurisdiction over every defendant.
An Internet service subscriber identified by an IP address without any
more information does not always guarantee that a court will have
personal jurisdiction over her. In fact, many defendants are dismissed in
later proceedings in BitTorrent cases because of lack of personal
147
jurisdiction. Fourth, joining multiple defendants, each of whom may
present different defenses or relate different factual circumstances
surrounding the alleged infringing activities, can also create possible jury
confusion at trial.
However, concerns for lack of personal jurisdiction and jury
confusion might be issues that are premature to entertain at this juncture
148
of the litigation. At the pleading stage, where defendants are not named
and plaintiffs have not even served the complaints, there are no concrete
facts to assess jury confusion or personal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, both
issues remain a potential problem down the road: As the number of joined
defendants reaches the hundreds and higher, the probability of jury
confusion and personal jurisdiction problems increases. A court is unlikely
to take on a case only to dismiss it in the future.
Factors such as the closeness of the relationship between the parties
to be joined and the plaintiffs’ motives do not bode well for joinder
either. It is undeniable that the relationship between the defendants
exists solely in their use of the BitTorrent protocol to download a specific
file. If the functionality of BitTorrent and how it differs from older P2P

144. See Tele-Media Co. of W. Conn. v. Antidormi, 179 F.R.D. 75, 76 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding
that, although a single action reduced plaintiffs’ fees and costs, it imposed significant burdens on the
clerk’s office, as each docketed order obligated the clerk to prepare and mail a copy of the order to
every defendant who had appeared).
145. Hard Drive Prods., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (“[The] courtroom could not accommodate all of
the defendants and their attorneys, and therefore could not hold case management conferences . . . .”).
146. On the Cheap, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99831, at *9–10.
147. E.g., Millennium TGA v. Doe, No. 10 C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110135, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 26, 2011); DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Doe, No. 10 Civ. 5760, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109464, at
*13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011).
148. See, e.g., IO Grp., Inc. v. Does, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133717, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 7, 2010); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 04 Civ. 2289 (RWS), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23560, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004).
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protocols are insufficient for the purpose of Rule 20 joinder, courts would
149
be hard pressed to find “closeness of the relationship” beyond the use of
BitTorrent. The plaintiffs’ motives also weigh against allowing joinder.
Although unspoken, it is a common assumption that the plaintiffs’ main
goal is to settle the claims out of court, and joinder provides economies
150
of scale that make this endeavor profitable. If the motive of the
plaintiffs is not exactly aligned with that of judicial economy and trial
convenience, the self-serving motive of the plaintiffs probably cannot
outweigh the other factors denying joinder.
However, shifting the focus of the “fundamental fairness” inquiry
from the future prospects of litigation to what is currently at stake could
favor joinder. The future problems implicated by issues of prejudice and
judicial economy would probably never arise given the plaintiffs’ motive to
procure a settlement early on during litigation. Our judicial system
traditionally encourages settlement out of court, and there is no reason to
151
fault plaintiffs’ reluctance in pursuing claims to judgment. As such, while
it could be unfair to the defendants to be joined in the face of their
different circumstances, it is quite conceivable that those logistical
152
problems might never become a reality. An uncertain cost in the future
does not necessarily outweigh a present benefit to plaintiffs.
There is also no requirement at this stage of the proceeding to require
a plaintiff to file a case that will be completely free of case management
issues in the future. Once joinder has been granted at the outset, Courts
are not obligated to suffer judicial inefficiency when it arises later in a
153
case. Rather, courts are free to sever and dismiss sua sponte, reviewable
only on abuse of discretion. On the contrary, one could even find that
joinder actually serves judicial efficiency because it is more manageable
for ISPs to respond to a single subpoena for all the defendants—as
opposed to requiring the plaintiff to file one suit per defendant and
154
forcing ISPs to respond to one subpoena per defendant.

149. Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980).
150. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does, No. C-11-3826 DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132449, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011) (noting that the subpoena creates great potential for a coercive and unjust
“settlement”); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–85, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581, at *6
(E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011) (“[T]he plaintiff has contacted [the defendants] directly with harassing telephone
calls, demanding $2,900 in compensation to end the litigation.”); see Michael Roberts, BitTorrent Motion
Alleges Legal Business Model Targeting Porn Downloaders, Denver Westword (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:13
PM), http://blogs.westword.com/latestword/2011/09/porn_downloaders_bittorrent_lawsuit.php.
151. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
152. See, e.g., Well Go USA, Inc. v. Unknown Participants in Filesharing Swarm Identified, No.
4:12-cv-00963, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137272, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2012) (“The issue of joinder is
better analyzed once unknown Defendants have been identified and served.”).
153. Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–15, No. 12-2077, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113704, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 10, 2012) (“[T]he Rules allow for re-examination as the case progresses.”).
154. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12-CV-3161, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132813, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Sept.
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Armed with the IP addresses as the only link to uncover the
infringers, plaintiffs suffer a heavy burden from a denial of joinder that
deprives them of the sole economically sustainable way to enforce their
copyrights. Although employing joinder to efficiently obtain identification
information may be a legitimate recourse, this application of joinder
rules—in a way unintended by rulemakers—not only raises normative
concerns but can also derogate court civil proceedings.
C. How Courts Have Responded
The BitTorrent litigation has yielded a wide spectrum of court
decisions, ranging from granting early discovery against joined defendants
155
to severing all defendants but one. One of the oft-cited decisions
granting early discovery comes from the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia. In Call of the Wild Movie, L.L.C. v. Does 1–1062, Time
Warner Cable received subpoenas to disclose identity information
corresponding to IP addresses submitted in three cases and subsequently
156
filed a motion to quash. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public
Citizen, and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation submitted an
157
amicus brief in support of Time Warner’s motion. The amici urged the
court to address issues of improper joinder, lack of personal jurisdiction
over the putative defendants, and the putative defendants’ First
158
Amendment right to anonymity. In response, the court held that joinder
was proper mainly because of the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the
nature of the BitTorrent protocol. The court first noted that a
determination of whether parties are properly joined pursuant to Rule 20
159
depends on whether they are “logically related.” The court proceeded to
18, 2012) (“Joinder at the discovery phase would be more efficient than conducting the same discovery in
nine separate cases.”); Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–108, No. DKC 11-3007, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25400, at *17 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2012) (“[R]esponding to the subpoenas all at once is more manageable
than severing the case into potentially over one hundred individual cases and requiring a concomitant
number of separate subpoenas . . . .”); see Call of the Wild Movie, L.L.C. v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d
332, 344 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Severance of the putative defendants associated with different IP addresses may
subject the same Time Warner customer to multiple suits for different instances of allegedly infringing
activity and, thus, would not be in the interests of the putative defendants.”).
155. See, e.g., Bubble Gum Prods., L.L.C. v. Doe, NO. 12-20367-CIV-SEITZ/SIMONTON, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100203, at *9–10 nn.5–6 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2012) (collecting cases); Pac. Century Int’l
v. Doe, 11 C 9064, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82796, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2012) (noting the split of
authority in the Northern District of Illinois).
156. Call of the Wild Movie, L.L.C. v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.D.C. 2011)
(ultimately holding that, in light of how the information subpoenaed is critical to the plaintiffs’
lawsuits, Time Warner Cable failed to demonstrate that the subpoenas were overly broad and unduly
burdensome).
157. See Memorandum of Amici Curiae Elec. Frontier Found. et al., in Support of Third Party Time
Warner Cable’s Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena, Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332.
158. Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
159. Id. at 342 (citing Disparte v. Corporate Exec. Bd., 223 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2004)).
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explain that in a BitTorrent network where every peer is obligated to
share her file when downloading, “each putative defendant is a possible
source for the plaintiffs’ motion pictures, and may be responsible for
160
distributing the motion pictures to the other putative defendants.” In
light of the flexibility of joinder rules to entertain broad claims, the court
161
found these facts satisfied Rule 20. Additionally, the court found that
at this procedural juncture, no defendants had been named or identified,
and thus it was premature to decide on matters of personal jurisdiction or
162
to evaluate the administrative burden going forward.
Many other decisions in other federal districts grant early discovery
and often deny motions to quash subpoenas based on the reasoning set
forth in Call of the Wild. They include decisions from the D.C. and
163
164
Maryland districts, the eastern districts of Pennsylvania and Michigan,
165
and several others. A plaintiff in one case even moved to sanction the
defendant’s attorney for presenting allegedly frivolous arguments in
166
support of a motion to quash. Although the court in that case ultimately
denied the motion for sanctions, this is one extreme end of the wide
spectrum of rulings across the country, where plaintiffs are not only
favored but also emboldened.
Notably, in districts where courts often grant early discovery,
plaintiffs are also successful in joining strikingly large numbers of
defendants. While the number of defendants sought to be joined has
167
varied widely and has been as low as five, the D.C. district has received a
160. Id. at 343.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 347–48.
163. E.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–1,495, No. 11-1741 (JDB/JMF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
137719 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–39, No. 12-cv-00096-AW, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57187 (D. Md. Apr. 23, 2012); Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–108, No. DKC 11-3007, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25400 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2012); K-Beech, Inc. v. Doe, No. 11-cv-01774-AW, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 136757 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2011); Voltage Pictures, No. 10-0873 (BAH), L.L.C. v. Doe, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50787 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011); W. Coast Prods. v. Doe, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011).
164. See, e.g., Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 12-2078, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143378 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 3, 2012); Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 12-2077, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113704 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 10, 2012); Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. 11-cv-15200, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87891 (E.D. Mich.
May 29, 2012); Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does, No. 11-7248, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41645 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23,
2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 282 F.R.D. 161 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–
28, 286 F.R.D. 319 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
165. For example, in New York, Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–5, 12 Civ. 2950 (JPO), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77469 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012); in Massachusetts, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–36, 286
F.R.D. 160 (D. Mass. 2012); in Florida, Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-266-FtM-29DNF, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129163 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012); in Texas, Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does, No. H-120699, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44810 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2012); and in California, Malibu Media, L.L.C. v.
Does 1–59, No. 1cv12-0888 AWI DLB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137654 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2012).
166. Maverick Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Doe, 276 F.R.D. 389, 395 (D.D.C. 2011).
167. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12 Civ. 2964 (JPO), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77486 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 2012) (attempting to join five defendants); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–11, No. 11-cv-01776-
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number of cases in which the number of defendants to be joined is
168
staggeringly high. On numerous occasions, plaintiffs have sought to join
169
five thousand or more defendants—as many as 24,583 in one case. This is
evidence that the joinder and jurisdictional problems that necessarily
derive from such a large group of defendants have not deterred certain
courts from granting early discovery. There are a few cases from the
District Court for the District of Columbia, however, where the court
questioned the joinder of a large number of defendants and subsequently
170
denied discovery on jurisdictional grounds. In Nu Image, Inc. v. Doe,
the court denied joining 23,322 defendants because a good faith showing
at least requires the plaintiff to resort to geolocation technology in an
attempt to locate the IP addresses to a locale within the court’s
171
jurisdiction, which the plaintiff failed to do. The court reasoned that
because the sole claim was copyright infringement, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a)
governed venue for claims asserted under the Copyright Act and
required an action to enforce the Act be brought in a judicial district “in
172
which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.” Despite an
acknowledgment that the plaintiff sought to identify all the infringers
conveniently and cheaply, the court held that discovery should be denied
if the information would be used in another lawsuit in a different
173
venue. Although early discovery was denied based on jurisdiction, the
court did not address the issue of joinder.
Decisions from the Eastern District of Virginia fall at the other end of
174
the spectrum. A handful of cases are representative. All the defendants
AW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128889 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2011) (attempting to join eleven defendants).
168. See Nu Image, Inc. v. Doe, No. 2:11-cv-545-FtM-29SPC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72402 (M.D.
Fla. May 9, 2012) (implicating more than three thousand defendants). Such decisions favoring plaintiff
did not go unnoticed in the public sphere. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, RIAA Lobbyist Becomes Federal
Judge, Rules on File-Sharing Cases, Ars Technica (Mar. 28, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2011/03/riaa-lobbyist-becomes-federal-judge-rules-on-file-sharing-cases.
169. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, No. 11-cv-01776-AW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128889 (D. Md.
Nov. 8, 2011); Voltage Pictures, L.L.C. v. Vazquez, No. 10-00873 (BAH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
121316 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2011); W. Coast Prods. v. Doe, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011).
170. Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1–23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2011); People Pictures v. Group
of Participants in Filesharing Swarm Identified by Hash, No. 11-1968 (JEB/JMF), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147859, at *7–9 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2011) (denying a discovery request because of the lack of
information establishing personal jurisdiction and venue).
171. Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
172. Id. at 37.
173. Id. at 41 (citing Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 353 n.17 (1978)).
174. See, e.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119333
(E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011); K-Beech, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581
(E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011); Raw Films, Ltd. v. Doe, No. 3:11cv532-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114996
(E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–58, No. 3:11cv531-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120235 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011). The only other district in which all decisions consistently deny joinder
is the Western District of Louisiana, although that district receives many fewer BitTorrent litigation
cases than those that lack a consensus. E.g., Twenty Media Inc. v. Swarm Sharing Hash Files, No. 6:12-
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the plaintiffs sought to join in each case numbered fewer than one
175
hundred. Except for one case, most courts did not look favorably upon
the plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain early discovery. Describing the plaintiffs’
demands for monetary settlements as reprehensible and threatening
behavior, courts in these cases went as far as to order the attorneys to
show cause why they should not be sanctioned for using the “offices of
the Court as an inexpensive means to gain the Doe defendants’ personal
176
information and coerce payment from them.” The courts then severed
the parties, finding the BitTorrent “swarm theory” insufficient to satisfy
177
joinder.
Between the two extremes—where at one end the defendant’s
attorney could be sanctioned and at the other the plaintiff’s attorney is at
risk—lie the remaining districts. The Northern District of California has
had a particularly high number of BitTorrent cases. This large sample
size presents a wide range of reasoning and legal grounds for court
178
decisions. Although other districts, such as the Southern District of
179
180
New York, the Northern District of Illinois, and the District of
181
Colorado, have ruled on a significant number of BitTorrent cases, they
often cite to cases decided in the Northern District of California with
182
similar underlying reasons for their decisions.
Most districts, including the Northern District of California, are
currently split on whether to grant early discovery against joined
183
defendants. During early 2011, a number of cases were granted early
cv-00031, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123163 (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2012).
175. See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Doe, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73159, at *4–5
(E.D. Va. July 1, 2011) (granting early discovery on the grounds of irreparable harm).
176. Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does 1–32, No. 3:11cv532-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114996, at *6 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 5, 2011); see Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119333, at *9 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–85, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, No. 3:11cv531JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581, at *6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–58,
No. 3:11cv531-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120235, at *7 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011).
177. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119333, at *6
(E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011).
178. See infra notes 184–187, 189–192.
179. E.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Does 1–30, 12 Civ. 3782 (LTS)(JLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135468 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2012) (permitting joinder); Zero Tolerance Entm’t, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12 Civ.
1083 (SAS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78834 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2012) (severing defendants).
180. E.g., Pac. Century Int’l v. Doe, 11 C 9064, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82796 (N.D. Ill. June 12,
2012) (finding joinder proper); Millennium TGA Inc. v. Does 1–800, 10 C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35406 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (severing defendants).
181. E.g., Sunlust Pictures, L.L.C. v. Cisa, No. 12-cv-00656-CMA-KMT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
150835 (D. Colo. Oct. 19, 2012) (finding joinder proper); Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–28, No. 12cv-2599-WJM-MEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144501 (D. Colo. Oct. 5, 2012) (finding joinder improper).
182. See supra note 181.
183. See, e.g., Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, No. 12 Civ. 3755 (VM), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107648, at *11–18 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012); Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Doe, No. DKC 11-3007,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59233, at *5–7 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2012) (collecting cases).
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discovery because the courts found that the pleadings satisfied the “good
184
cause” standard, as well as the Seescandy.com factors. However, not long
after BitTorrent cases started flooding into the district, courts started to
185
question the validity of the BitTorrent “swarm” theory. Looking to
earlier Doe litigation cases launched by the music industry, many courts
started to sever the defendants, asserting that the architecture of
186
BitTorrent is not enough to distinguish itself from older P2P technologies.
In a case where the plaintiff attempted to join 162 putative defendants, the
court noted that even if all the IP addresses derived from a single swarm,
“the lack of information regarding the period [including all the timestamps
corresponding to] the activity associated with each of the addresses” and
the lack of “proof that bits from each of these 162 addresses were ever
assembled into a single file” undermined the proposition that there was
187
common activity linking all the 162 addresses in the case. Since certain
precedents held that employing the same P2P protocol was insufficient for
188
joinder, these BitTorrent cases should not compel a different result.
Based on such reasoning, file transfer among users, all of whom both
download and upload a single file from each other on a network, would
not satisfy the “same transaction [or] occurrence” standard unless the
plaintiffs can describe all transfer steps to trace all the direct and indirect
sources of every “block” of the file owned by each user. Based on the
current forensic software, plaintiffs are unlikely to obtain evidence
detailing such a level of specificity.
Starting in mid-2011, an increasing number of courts started severing
189
parties by analogizing to cases that involved older P2P technologies.

184. E.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does, No. C-11-01956 EDL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105229
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); Millennium TGA v. Does, No. 11-2258 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80065
(N.D. Cal. July 22, 2011); Boy Racer, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:11-cv-02833 EJD (PSG), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79735 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011); Pink Lotus Entm’t, L.L.C. v. Does 1–46, No. C-11-02263 HRL,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2011); VPR Internationale v. Doe, No. C 11-01494
LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45118 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011).
185. E.g., Diabolic Video Prods. v. Does 1–2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58351,
at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011); Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1–21, No. 11-2258 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 53465, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011) (stating that the decentralization of BitTorrent leading to
vicarious liability is an unsupported and novel legal theory). For a change in the trend in the District of
Maryland over time, see Malibu Media v. Does 1–34, No. PJM 12-1195, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67567 (D.
Md. May 11, 2012) (severing defendants); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–11, No. 11-cv-01776-AW, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128889 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2011) (denying motion to quash).
186. Diabolic Video Prods. v. Does 1–2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58351, at
*12–13 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011).
187. Media Prods. v. Does 1–162, No.: C 12-03801 EJD (PSG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134226, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012).
188. See supra notes 126, 128. But cf. supra notes 121–122.
189. Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–13, No. 2:12-cv-01513 JAM DAD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
148215 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012); Smash Pictures v. Does, No. 2:12-cv-301 JAM CKD, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82985 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2012); Liberty Media Holdings, L.L.C. v. BitTorrent Swarm, No.
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Certain cases where early discovery had previously been granted against
190
joined defendants now had their defendants severed. As an alternative
to finding joinder improper based on the test of common transaction or
occurrence, some courts resort to the discretionary power grounded in the
“fundamental fairness” doctrine to sever the parties in the name of judicial
191
economy and case manageability. Other courts in the same district,
however, remain persuaded that BitTorrent technology is sufficiently
192
different, and thus joinder is proper at this juncture of the litigation.
Some decisions were crafted to be tentative, seemingly in an attempt
to narrow holdings to specific circumstances. Courts that severed based on
jurisdictional grounds opened up the possibility that early discovery might
be granted against defendants whose IP addresses could be located within
193
the district. Indeed some courts decided to grant early discovery once the
plaintiffs submitted additional information—for example, to support the
assertion that all IP addresses were traced to the same “swarm” or
194
information regarding the locations of the IP addresses. Courts also
1:11-cv-21567-KMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135847, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2011); Liberty Media
Holdings, L.L.C. v. BitTorrent Swarm, No. 1:11-cv-21525-KMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126333, at *7
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2011); Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1–60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92994, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011); McGip, L.L.C. v. Does 1–149, No. C 11-02331 LB, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85363, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011); Pac. Century Int’l Ltd. v. Does 1–101, No. C-1102533-(DMR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73837, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011); Lightspeed v. Does 1–
1000, 10 C 5604, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35392, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011).
190. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–84, No. C11-03648 HRL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135565, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011).
191. See, e.g., On the Cheap, L.L.C. v. Does 1–5011, No. C10-4472 BZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99831, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150,
1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
192. See, e.g., First Time Videos, L.L.C. v. Does 1–95, No. C 11-3822 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116434 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1–1474, No. C 11-2770 MEJ, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 94909 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011); McGip v. Doe, NO: 11-CV-03679 EJD, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87913 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011); Millennium TGA v. Does, No. 11-2258 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 80065 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2011; New Sensations, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 10-05863 WHA, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 132519 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011).
193. Millennium TGA v. Doe, No. 10 C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110135, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
26, 2011) (dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the fact that the geolocation
service indicated that the IP addresses were located outside of Illinois); DigiProtect USA Corp. v.
Doe, No. 10 Civ. 5760, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109464, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (dismissing the
case because the plaintiff does not bear the burden of demonstrating that the IP addresses are
connected to New York, despite the availability of free, publicly available technology that matches IP
addresses to a geographic region); Lightspeed v. Does 1–1000, 10 C 5604, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35392, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding no reason why venue should have been in this district
and no demonstration that the IP addresses were located in Illinois).
194. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 12-CV-00126 (AJN), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10803 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
30, 2012) (declining to sever because the defendants were trading the exact same file as part of the same
swarm); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–57, No. 2:11-CV-00358-FtM-36SPC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132834, at *9
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding that jurisdiction is proper because “Plaintiff took care to ensure that the
IP addresses at issue in this case could be traced to a physical address located within this District”);
OpenMind Solutions, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 11-3311 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *6, 17–18 (N.D.
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tentatively granted early discovery because the time stamps that indicated
the time at which the infringing activities were observed did not span more
than two weeks, or the number of defendants sought to be joined was
195
sufficiently small. Alternatively, in exchange for granting joinder, at least
one court has precluded plaintiffs from direct communication with the
defendants without the court’s permission out of concern for improper
196
negotiation practices. These various approaches can influence plaintiffs’
strategies in order to obtain early discovery against joined defendants.

Conclusion
Although the BitTorrent protocol provides its users a unique
environment where their conduct can legally meet the “same transaction
[or] occurrence” test under Rule 20, this application of Rule 20 may be
unsettling for normative reasons. The tension between the proper
exercise of a legal right and reprehensibly predatory behavior underlies
the lack of consensus among the courts. Since joinder rules poorly
address the normative concerns raised by the BitTorrent litigation, courts
developed diverse reasoning—including joinder, personal jurisdiction,
and venue—in an attempt to rationalize severing the defendants. For
example, one main reason is that IP addresses do not always definitively
link to an infringer. Courts find the evidence inadequate because ISP
“subscriber John Doe 1 could be an innocent parent whose Internet
access was abused by her minor child, while John Doe 2 might share a
computer with a roommate who infringed Plaintiffs’ works,” and as such,
197
clicking a command to participate in a swarm is inadequate for joinder.
Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (noting that the plaintiff had traced all IP addresses within the state of California, as
well as the fact that the hash associated with the file remains the same within the swarm).
195. Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–14, No. 1:12-CV-263, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174384, at *25
(N.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 2012) (granting joinder for a case involving only fourteen defendants located in the
district); AF Holdings L.L.C. v. Does 1–96, No. C-11-03335 JSC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134655, *10–11
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (noting that the time stamps spanned a two-week period and thus the plaintiff
had made a prima facie showing that the Doe defendants were properly joined at this time of the
litigation); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Doe, No. C 11-01567 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130055, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (noting that case management concerns were no longer present given that there were
only two Does present); MCGIP, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. C-11-1495 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64188, at *3
(N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (denying motion to quash and noting that only eighteen defendants were sought
to be joined). But cf. New Sensations, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12-3800 JSC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142032, at
*21–22 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012) (denying joinder on manageability grounds); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v.
Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying joinder because different timestamps
over a period of two weeks did not support participation in the same swarm at the same time).
196. W. Coast Prods. v. Does 1–1434, No. 11-55 (JEB/JMF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110847, at
*24–25 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2012) (precluding the plaintiff from communicating directly with the Doe
defendants prior to plaintiff’s naming these individuals as actual defendants in the complaint and
imposing a “good faith requirement” to name defendants who are D.C. residents).
197. Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. C 11-02768 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128030, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 4, 2011); Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, 12 Civ. 2950 (JPO), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77469, at *3
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Although IP addresses do not guarantee a successful claim against the
subscriber of that Internet service, they are still the best means by which
plaintiffs can initiate litigation and further their investigative efforts at
this stage. There is no requirement that a certain percentage of the
198
defendants joined in a case must turn out to be actual infringers.
Especially when the defendants are not identified, it seems premature to
consider the potential activities of each defendant and the corresponding
199
impact on joinder. Nevertheless, probably out of normative concerns,
courts do go to lengths such as this to defeat the BitTorrent plaintiffs’
prima facie cases for joinder.
A major concern is that the BitTorrent plaintiffs’ main goal to
compel settlements after obtaining identification information is to harass
and threaten innocent people. Many courts and the general public often
characterize plaintiffs’ communications to defendants as coercive.
Allowing joinder and early discovery would be unfair to innocent
defendants who feel the need to pay the settlement amount solely to
avoid harassment—recall the grandmother with an unsecured wireless
200
network. Although the grandmother story might not be representative
of most putative defendants, it is illustrative that any number of innocent
201
defendants could be vulnerable to such litigation tactics. As some
courts have indicated, the “potential for coercing unjust settlements from
innocent defendants trumps [the plaintiff’s] interest in maintaining low
202
litigation costs.” Other courts are less subtle and have directly charged
plaintiffs of using the “offices of the Court as an inexpensive means to
gain the Doe defendants’ personal information and coerce payment from
203
them.” A related concern is that, in joining multiple defendants,

(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (noting that illegal downloads “from a certain IP address do[] not necessarily
mean that the owner of that IP address was the infringer”); In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright
Infringement Cases, No. 11-3995(DRH)(GRB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61447, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 1,
2012) (“[T]he assumption that the person who pays for Internet access at a given location is the same
individual who allegedly downloaded a single sexually explicit film is tenuous . . . .”).
198. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Doe, 12-CV-00126 (AJN), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10803, at *9–10
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012) (stating that “Plaintiff’s counsel estimated that 30% of the names turned over
by ISPs are not those of individuals who actually downloaded or shared copyrighted material” as a
reason to issue a protective order to accompany the subpoena).
199. See, e.g., Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-266-FtM-29DNF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129163, at *21 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (dismissing motion to sever as premature).
200. Hamilton, supra note 35.
201. Temple, supra note 36.
202. K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–41, No. V-11-46, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31803, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
8, 2012); see Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–130, No. C-11-3826 DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132449, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011) (“[T]he potential to draw numerous innocent Internet users
into the litigation[] plac[es] a burden upon them that outweighs Plaintiff’s need for discovery.”).
203. K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–85, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581, at *6–7 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 5, 2011); see New Sensations, Inc. v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-1885-GEB-EFB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
149786, at *11 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (noting that “federal courts are not cogs in a plaintiff’s
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plaintiffs avoid paying the court filing fees required in an application for
204
early discovery that are supposed to be filed for each defendant. Courts
find that “postponing a determination on joinder” would subject the
205
government to “lost revenue of perhaps millions of dollars.”
As for plaintiffs’ practice of coercing innocent defendants, it would
be helpful if there were informative statistics as to the over-inclusiveness
of a typical group of defendants that plaintiffs try to join. It is not clear if
the harassment of innocent people is a cost the society is willing to pay in
206
exchange for this scheme of copyright enforcement. Alternatively, in an
effort to prevent abusive settlement practice, courts can also appoint ad
207
litem counsel to represent the Doe defendants. However, this is still a
burden on our judicial system in an attempt to resist the predatory
behavior of plaintiffs that does not ultimately resolve the underlying
problem.
Lastly, using joinder rules solely to gather identification information
cheaply during early discovery confounds the real purpose of joinder.
The purpose of joinder is to entertain the broadest possible scope of
208
action for “judicial economy and trial convenience.” When copyright
owners resort to the courts, it is financially worthwhile only if civil
procedure joinder rules are employed for an unintended purpose—not to
truly litigate, but to obtain identification information from IP addresses. If
the only intention of the plaintiff is to obtain identification information,
the concerns of “judicial economy and trial convenience” are entirely
inapposite. Ultimately, when acquisition of confidential information

copyright-enforcement business model” and that the court “will not idly watch what is essentially an
extortion scheme”); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–41, No. V-11-46, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31803, at *17
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012) (noting that enforcing copyright in “a cost-effective manner does not justify
perverting the joinder rules”).
204. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Doe, 589 F. Supp. 2d 151, 154 (D. Conn. 2008).
205. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 11-3995(DRH)(GRB), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61447, at *38 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012) (noting that plaintiffs attempt to “limit their
expenses as against the amount of settlements they are able to negotiate”); Arista Records, L.L.C. v.
Doe, No. 1:07-CV-2828, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90183, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008); Arista
Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1–27, No. CV-07-162-B-W, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6241, at *19–21 n.5 (D. Me.
Jan. 25, 2008) (suggesting that plaintiffs might have violated Rule 11 by alleging that joinder is proper
in order to avoid paying filing fees).
206. Cf. Media Prods. v. Does, No. 12 Civ. 3719 (HB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125366, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2012) (“[S]ettlements are for notoriously low amounts relative to the possible
statutory damages, but high relative to the low value of the work and minimal costs of mass
litigation.”).
207. E.g., Mick Haig Prods., e.K. v. Does, No. 3:10-CV-1900-N, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128366, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011).
208. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); see Mosley v. Gen. Motors, 497 F.2d
1330, 1332–33 (8th Cir. 1974); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d
914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977).
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replaces the resolution of a dispute in court as the real purpose, the
integrity and purpose of the courts are left in question.
In the absence of an appropriate legislative response to P2P
209
copyright infringement, courts and plaintiffs are left battling with legal
gymnastics. Congress had previously introduced a bill, SOPA, in an
attempt to stem copyright infringement by targeting websites that index
210
sources of copyrighted files available for download on P2P networks.
In effect, without the websites, finding files to download can prove
laborious for P2P users. However, neither SOPA nor its successor,
211
OPEN, managed to draw enough support to make it out of the House.
Despite these laudable, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to curb the activities
of indexing websites, a future bill should anticipate that technology will
212
soon evolve to circumvent the need for indexing websites. It is
important for the new copyright legislation to rely less on technologyrelated aspects for its effectiveness in order to impart some resilience in
countering the ever-changing nature of technology.

209. While § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act allows subpoena of identification
information outside of litigation, this may not apply to the BitTorrent plaintiffs because of how certain
courts have interpreted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbor provisions together with the
subpoena provisions. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012) (exempting certain service providers that do not
provide storage, a category into which the ISPs implicated in the BitTorrent litigation would fall); id.
§ 512(h) (“A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner’s behalf may request the clerk
of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged
infringer . . . . The request may be made by filing with the clerk . . . a copy of a notification described in
subsection (c)(3)(A); a proposed subpoena; and a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for
which the subpoena is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information
will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under this title.”).
210. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(a) (2011); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th
Cong. § 3 (2011); Jacquelin D. Lipton, Law of the Intermediated Information Exchange, 64 Fla. L.
Rev. 1337, 1338 (2012) (critiquing the Stop Online Piracy Act).
211. Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. (2012).
212. Computer science research to decentralize keyword search is ongoing. See, e.g., Cubit an
Approximate Matching Peer-to-Peer Overlay, Cubit Project, http://www.cs.cornell.edu/~bwong/cubit
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013); Tibler Makes BitTorrent Impossible to Shut Down, TorrentFreak (Feb. 8,
2012), http://torrentfreak.com/tribler-makes-bittorrent-impossible-to-shut-down-120208; Tibler Set to
Make BitTorrent Sites Obsolete, TorrentFreak (Oct. 28, 2008), http://torrentfreak.com/tribler-set-tomake-bittorrent-sites-obsolete-081028.
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